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A Revolution in State Taxation of

Commerce?*
William B. Lockhart**
I.

INTRODUCTION

To those who might have expected that I would discuss
constitutional philosophy or the latest constitutional developments concerning obscenity, I assure you that recent developments in state taxation of interstate commerce are of far
greater importance. Recent changes in the United States
Supreme Court's treatment of state taxation of interstate commerce suggest that a potentially revolutionary shift is now underway in the court-created limits on such taxation. This
constitutional development has far-ranging implications for
both large and small businesses and their lawyers.
In addition to its current significance, this topic seems particularly appropriate for this tapering-off-a-career reflection because it relates to the article that opened my academic career,
forty-three years ago.' One object of that article was to nudge
the Supreme Court into limiting or departing from what I shall
call the Formal Rule, 2 long held even then, that a state may not
impose a tax on any activity or process viewed by the Court as
a part of interstate commerce, even though the tax threatens
no discriminatory burden on commerce. 3 At the time I had little success in that objective,4 and turned to more malleable
subjects like obscenity.5 But now, nearly half a century later,
* This Article is based upon a lecture delivered by Professor Lockhart at
the University of Minnesota Law School on May 8, 1981, as one of the William
B. Lockhart Lectures, named in his honor.
** Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, 52 HARv. L. REV. 617

(1939).
2. See notes 12-61 infra and accompanying text.
3. Lockhart, supra note 1, at 618-19, 629, 642-44.
4. See McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944); Freeman v.
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S.
602, 610 (1951). But see McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S.
33, 58 (1940) (a temporary success when the Court evaded the Formal Rule).
5. See Lockhart & McClure, Literature,the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295 (1954); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Ob-
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the Court has explicitly and unanimously repudiated one common application of the Formal Rule in two recent cases. I claim
no credit for this belated turnaround, but I eagerly return to
discuss the implications of these decisions that shook the foundations underlying much of the current law.
The Supreme Court shook the foundations for the first time
in 1977 with Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.6 Justice
Blackmun's unanimous opinion upheld a Mississippi tax on the
"privilege of doing business" in the state,7 as applied to a motor
carrier engaged there exclusively in interstate commerce. In
doing so, the Court expressly overruled Spector Motor Service,
Inc. v. O'Connor.8 The foundations shook again the next year
when another unanimous Blackmun opinion in Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos.9 upheld a similar state privilege tax, as applied to a stevedoring
company engaged exclusively in interstate and foreign commerce in Washington. Both cases explicitly repudiated the
long-established rule that a state may not tax the privilege or
business 10 of engaging exclusively in interstate commerce-the
Spector rule."
The potential significance of these recent decisions lies not
in their rejection of Spector and its predecessors, though this
has independent importance, but in their implication for the
Formal Rule, the more sweeping rule of decision from which
the Spector rule was derived.12 The Formal Rule has had far
more extensive application than the Spector rule. It has been
the basis over the past century for invalidating many different
types of state taxes on varying aspects of interstate commerce. 13 Hence, the effect of Complete Auto and Stevedoring
scenity: The Developing ConstitutionalStandards, 45 MN. L. REv. 5 (1960);
Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First
Amendment, 9 GA. L. REv. 533 (1975).
6. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
7. Id. at 289.
8. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
9. 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
10. While the taxes invalidated under this rule were usually "privilege"
taxes, the rule applied equally to taxes on occupations or "doing business."
See text accompanying notes 113-16 infra.
11. Following Complete Auto's lead in overruling Spector, Stevedoring
overruled two Spector predecessors: Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring
Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947); Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302
U.S. 90 (1937). See 435 U.S. at 750.
12. For evolution of this Formal Rule, see text accompanying notes 14-30
infra.
13. For illustrations, see notes 35, 121-22, 147, 159-60, 173-74 infra and accompanying text.
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on the Formal Rule and its other applications is vitally important to the states' power to tax interstate business.
This Article, then, explores the potential impact of Complete Auto and Stevedoring on the law relating to state taxation
of interstate commerce. Such an exploration raises several
questions. To the extent that the Formal Rule has been the basis for invalidating state taxes, is that basis for decision still
available in its applications outside a Spector-type tax? This
question requires consideration of the origins and rationale of
the Formal Rule and the reasons advanced in Complete Auto
and Stevedoring for overruling its application to taxes on the
privilege of engaging in interstate business. Do those origins
and reasons, coupled with the unanimous rejection of the privilege tax application of the Formal Rule, suggest its probable rejection in its other applications as well? If so, to what extent
may the present limitations on state taxation that are attributable in whole or in part to the Formal Rule nonetheless remain
the law because supportable for independent reasons?
11. THE FORMAL RULE
A. THE ORIGIN OF THE FoRMAL RULE
Nearly a century ago, two decades of decisions firmly established the Formal Rule: a state tax on any activity or process of interstate commerce was an invalid "regulation of
commerce." Repeatedly cited in support of that rule were two
1872 companion cases bearing the same name 14 but distinguished in the reports as Case of the State Freight Tax15 and
State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts.16 In State Freight Tax
the Supreme Court made the actual ruling that held invalid, as
applied to interstate cargo, a tax on freight carried within the
state. It viewed the tax as "in effect a regulation of interstate
commerce"1 7 on a subject exclusively within the power of Congress under the need-for-uniformity criterion established in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens.18 The Court thought interstate
transportation of passengers or merchandise required "one reg14. Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 284 (1872). Little
noted was a laconic opinion six years earlier invalidating a state tax on ships

entering the harbor as a "regulation of commerce" within the power of Congress. Southern S.S. Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31, 34 (1867). See
also Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 139 (1868).
15. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872).
16. Id. at 284.
17. Id. at 279.
18. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
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ulating power" to guard against destruction of "commercial intercourse between States remote from each other," which
might be "crushed under the load of many" similar state
taxes.19 On the same day, the Court summarized this State
Freight Tax ruling in oft-quoted dicta in Railway Gross Receipts: a state "tax upon interstate transportation" is invalid
because it is "a regulation of interstate commerce, which Con20
gress only can make."
Within the next fifteen years the Court advanced the same
Formal Rule rationale in nine different cases as the basis for invalidating state taxes on various aspects of interstate transportation,21 communication, 22 and trade.2 3 Some were taxes on the
activity itself,24 some on gross receipts therefrom,25 and some
were license taxes on engaging in the activity. 2 6 In each case
the underlying reason the Court gave was the same: the tax
was a regulation of interstate or foreign commerce, exclusively
within the power of Congress.
Toward the end of this formative era, two 1887 cases clearly
19. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 280.
20. Id. at 292-93. Railway Gross Receipts actually upheld a tax on gross
receipts from interstate transportation, but this holding was overruled by Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 343 (1887). See text accompanying notes 49-50 infra.
21. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230, 247 (1887) (tax on those providing cars
to run on another's railroad, measured by gross receipts, invalid as applied to
steamship company engaged in interstate and foreign commerce); Pickard v.
Pullman S. Car Co., 117 U.S. 34, 49 (1886) ("privilege" tax on running and using
sleeping cars on railroads in state, at $50 per car, invalid as applied to those
used exclusively in interstate commerce); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 211 (1885) (tax on "doing business," measured by capital
stock, invalid as applied to interstate ferry company); Moran v. New Orleans,
112 U.S. 69, 73 (1884) (license tax on towboats engaged in interstate and foreign
commerce invalid). See also Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456,
472 (1874).
22. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 645 (1888) (flat rate license tax on
doing business, invalid as to telegraph company engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce); Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460, 466 (1881) (tax on doing business as telegraph company, measured by number of messages, invalid
as to interstate messages). But see Osborne v. Florida, 164 U.S. 650, 655 (1897)
(license tax valid when construed to apply only to express company's intrastate business). See also Pacific TeL & TeL Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 403,
415-16 (1936).
23. Robbins v. Shelby Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 498 (1887) (county flat rate
license tax on drummers, invalid as applied to one soliciting orders for goods to
be shipped into state from outside).
24. See cases cited in notes 21-23 supra, except those also cited in note 26
infra.
25. Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 327 (1887).
26. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 641 (1888); Robbins v. Shelby
Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 491 (1887); Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U.S. 69, 69
(1884).
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indicated that the Formal Rule was to be applied broadly and
unequivocally. Invalidating a county license tax on drummers
as applied to one soliciting orders for goods to be delivered
from out of state, the Court in Robbins v. Shelby Taxing DistriCt 27 rejected the defense that the tax was not discriminatory
by stating that "[i]nterstate commerce cannot be taxed at all,
even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce."2 8 Even more sweeping was Leloup v. Port of
Mobile,2 9 in which the Court struck down a license tax on a telegraph company doing interstate business:
[N]o State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any
form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, and the reason
is that such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a
30
regulation of it, which belongs solely to Congress.
B.

THE ROLE OF THE FORMAL RuLE BEFORE

1977

The Formal Rule, thus created and expressed, played a major role in adjudicating the validity of state taxes affecting commerce for over one hundred years, from its origin in 1873 until
Complete Auto in 1977. It was by no means the sole basis for
striking down such state taxes. Other bases, quite independent
of the Formal Rule, were discrimination against interstate or
foreign commerce, 31 the risk of multiple taxation not borne by
comparable local commerce,3 2 unfair apportionment of property or income attributable to more than one state, 33 and the
absence of due process jurisdiction to tax.34 A great many
taxes of widely varying types, however, were invalidated by in35
voking some form of the Formal Rule.
27. 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
28. Id. at 497.
29. 127 U.S. 640 (1888).
30. Id. at 648.
31. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 332
(1977); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1963).
32. See, e.g., Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 94 (1972); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938).
33. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Tax Conm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 329 (1968)
(property tax); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931) (income tax).
34. See, e.g., McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
35. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 121-22, 134, 147, 159-61, 173-74 infra.
Such cases include Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946), which invalidated a gross receipts tax imposed by the seller's state on an interstate sale because it was viewed as a "direct tax" on interstate commerce; McLeod v. J.E.
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944), which held invalid a retail sales tax when
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Because the Formal Rule condemned only taxes imposed
on an activity or process viewed as a part of interstate commerce, the Court still managed to sustain a substantial variety

of state taxes that required interstate business to pay a share
of the costs of local government. 36 The more important of these
included property taxes, fairly apportioned;3 7 license, privilege,
or occupation taxes if imposed on what the Court viewed as intrastate activities 38 retail sales taxes, if a rationale to avoid the
Formal Rule was available,3 9 and compensatory use taxes on

goods acquired through an interstate transaction but used in
the taxing state;40 net income taxes on that portion of net income fairly attributable to activities in the taxing state;4 ' and,
in later years, gross receipts taxes on receipts fairly attributable to activities in the taxing state. 42 Necessarily, the validity of
such taxes depended upon whether the Court considered the

taxed activity sufficiently remote from interstate commerce itself to escape the Formal Rule.43 Whether we will be spared

such tenuous distinctions in the future depends upon whether
Complete Auto leads to the rejection of the Formal Rule in its
other manifestations. 44
applied to interstate sales in the buyers' state because this is "to tax an interstate transaction"; Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325, 327 (1925)
(citing Robbins v. Shelby Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497-98 (1887)), one of a long
line of cases that voided taxes on taking orders for the sale of goods as applied
to sellers of out-of-state goods; and of course the Spector decision, 340 U.S. 602,
610 (1951) (see text accompanying notes 8-13 supra), which struck down a tax
on the privilege of engaging in business when applied to an exclusive interstate
business because this taxed "the privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate
commerce."
36. When consistent with the Formal Rule, the Court recognized the importance of interstate commerce paying its way. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 46 (1940); Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
37. See, e.g., Brainiff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 597-98 (1954).
38. See, e.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 258
(1938); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604, 610 (1938).
39. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 4950 (1940).
40. See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583 (1937).
41. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219
(1980); Moorman Mg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278 (1978).
42. See, e.g., Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419
U.S. 560, 564 (1975); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 441
(1964); Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511, 515 (1951).
43. Compare Coverdale v. Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604, 610 (1938) with Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954); compare McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 58 (1940) with McLeod
v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 329 (1944).
44. For a discussion of this issue, see text accompanying note 117 infra.
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THE RATIONALE OF THE FORMAL RULE

The rationale underlying the Formal Rule is of critical importance in appraising whether the reasoning of Complete Auto
foreshadows the total repudiation of the Formal Rule in all of
its applications. Complete Auto and Stevedoring decided only
that taxes on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce
were valid.45 They did not decide whether the Formal Rule
may continue to invalidate other types of taxes. To assist in answering this question we must first understand the reasoning
that supports the Formal Rule and then examine the Complete
Auto rationale and its impact on the Formal Rule.
A common rationale ran through the two decades of decisions that gave rise to the Formal Rule, as well as through its
later applications. The Court classified as a "regulation of commerce" within the exclusive power of Congress under the Cooley test, and thus outside state power, any state tax on an
activity viewed as a part of interstate commerce. 6 Although
State Freight Tax also mentioned the danger that interstate
commerce might be "crushed under the load" of similar taxes
imposed by other states,4 7 the later cases did not inquire into
such factors in applying the Cooley need-for-uniformity test.
They simply concluded that any state tax on what the Court
viewed as interstate commerce was outside state power, because it was within the exclusive power of Congress.46
Although that was the doctrinal basis for the Formal Rule,
underlying it appears to have been a judicial judgment that to
permit the states to tax interstate commerce itself would
threaten unmanageable burdens on commerce. The Court appears to have doubted its capacity to guard commerce from
harmful state tax burdens by less drastic means. One of the
opinions in the formative two decades, PhiladelphiaSteamship
Co. v. Pennsylvania,49 based its decision on the invalidity of a
tax on interstate transportation, and commented on the "disastrous effects" of recognizing state power to tax interstate or foreign commerce. The Court warned, "[i]f the power exists...
at all, it has no limit but the discretion of the state, and might
45. The cases overruled in these two cases involved only the privilege tax
issue. See the discussion of Spector, text accompanying note 8 supra, and the
cases cited in note 11 supra.
46. See text accompanying notes 14-30 supra.
47. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
48. See, e.g., Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230, 240 (1887).
49. 122 U.S. 326 (1887) (tax on gross receipts from interstate commerce
held invalid under Formal Rule).
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be exercised in such a manner as to drive away that commerce
... seriously affecting the business and prosperity of other
states ..... 50 This decision revealed two related concernsthe threat of excessive, burdensome taxes if any could be imposed on interstate commerce and judicial inability to control
the amount if the power to tax were recognized.
In more modem times, Justice Frankfurter's opinions reflected the same doctrinal basis for the Formal Rule, as well as
a similar practical concern over burdening commerce. In striking down a retail sales tax by the buyer's state on an interstate
sale because it "tax[ed] an interstate transaction," Justice
Frankfurter, in his majority opinion in McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth
Co.,51 characterized the tax as a "tax on the freedom of
purchase."5 2 The Court viewed a "tax on an interstate sale" as
involving
an assumption of power by a State which the Commerce Clause was
meant to end. The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create
an area of free trade among the several States. That clause vested the
power of taxing a transaction forming an unbroken
process of inter53
state commerce in the Congress, not in the States.

The McLeod opinion thus reflects both the doctrine that Congress has the exclusive power to tax interstate commerce and
the pragmatic fear that to recognize state taxing power in this
situation would unduly interfere with the policy of "free trade"
between the states.
Two years later and again speaking for the majority, Justice Frankfurter expanded upon this justification for the Formal
Rule in Freemanv. Hewit.54 In holding invalid a gross receipts
tax by the seller's state on the proceeds from an interstate sale,
he avoided the pragmatic reason asserted for such a result a
few years earlier-the risk of a cumulative tax burden.5 5 Instead, he reverted to the Formal Rule: the commerce clause
"by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the States." 56 He contrasted a "direct" tax on interstate commerce with several of the valid methods for making
57
interstate commerce bear its share of the state tax load:
While these permitted taxes may, in an ultimate sense, come out of in50. Id. at 346.
51. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
52. Id. at 330.
53. Id. at 330-31.
54. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
55. See Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439 (1939);
J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938).
56. 329 U.S. at 252.
57. See text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
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terstate commerce, they are not, as would be a tax on gross receipts, a
direct imposition on that very freedom of commercial flow which for
more than a hundred and fifty years has been the ward of the Commerce Clause.
... Nor is there any warrant in the constitutional principles heretofore applied by this Court to support the notion that a State may be
allowed one single-tax-worth of direct interference with the free flow of
commerce.... Trade being a sensitive plant, a direct tax upon it to
some extent at least deters trade even if its effect is not precisely calculable.5 8

The Court never explained why a tax "on" interstate commerce threatened commerce any more than a tax in the same
amount, measured the same way, imposed on a taxable subject.
Nor did it attempt to explain why the same pragmatic standards and other considerations used by the Court to protect interstate commerce from unfair burdens of taxes not subject to
the Formal Rule could not also suffice to protect against unfair
burdens from taxes "on" interstate commerce itself.
One further explanation was advanced for the view that a
state cannot tax the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. In Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone,59 Justice Reed
spoke for four members of a Court equally divided on the issue:
[T]he privilege of carrying on interstate commerce itself is immune
from state taxation. This is because it is a privilege beyond the power
of a state to grant....
... This is not because of the financial burden. Other taxes may
equally burden the commerce.... It is because the commerce clause
.. does not leave to the states any
power to permit or refuse the car60
rying on of interstate commerce.

But the rule defended in Interstate Oil did not depend
upon a magic word-"privilege." The Formal Rule equally invalidated a tax on engaging in business, or an occupation tax,
imposed on one engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. 61
The justices were saying that because the state cannot forbid
engaging in interstate business, a premise no one questions, it
cannot tax engaging in such a business-a sheer non-sequitor.
58. 329 U.S. at 256-57.
59. 337 U.S. 662 (1949). Justice Burton took no position on this issue, viewing the application of the tax as limited to intrastate commerce, id. at 668-69
(Burton, J., concurring), but he wrote the majority opinion in Spector two years
later.
60. Id. at 677, 680.
61. See text accompanying notes 113-16 infra. Even Interstate Oil itself
note& "[Tihis Court has never interpreted the commerce clause to allow a
state tax for the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce or one upon that
commerce itself." 337 U.S. at 680.
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The power to forbid an activity is not a prerequisite to the
power to tax it.
We turn now to the Complete Auto and Stevedoring opinions and their relevance to the reasons underlying the Formal
Rule.
III. THE IMPACT OF COMPLETE AUTO AND
STEVEDORING
A.

THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING COMPLETE A UTO AND
STEVEDORING

Complete Auto and Stevedoring reflect three policy decisions. First, these cases reflect a decision to give broader
sweep to the policy emphasized in 1938 in Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue 62 not to "relieve those engaged in interstate
commerce from their just share of state tax burden even
though it increases the cost of doing the business." 63 A second
policy reflected in these cases is a decision to base the validity
of taxes on the act or privilege of engaging in interstate commerce upon their "practical effect" and "economic realities"
rather than upon legal formalities that tend to create only a
"trap for the unwary draftsman." 64 Finally, Complete Auto and
Stevedoring reflect the Court's decision to apply to such taxes
the same criteria already developed for determining the validity of "indirect" taxes not imposed on interstate commerce itself.65

By its ruling in Complete Auto, the Court made the Western
Live Stock "just share" policy applicable to taxes on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, which it recognized
had until then enjoyed "a sort of 'free trade' immunity" from
such tax burdens. 66 Stating flatly that "the Court has rejected
the proposition that interstate commerce is immune from state
taxation," 67 the Court quoted as authority a similar statement 68
from its 1975 decision in Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle,69
62. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
63. Id. at 254.
64. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1977). See
text accompanying notes 72-78 infra.
65. See text accompanying notes 79-91 infra.
66. 430 U.S. at 278.
67. Id. at 288.
68. "'It is a truism that the mere act of carrying on business in interstate
commerce does not exempt a corporation from state taxation."' Id. (quoting
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975)).
69. 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
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which had foreshadowed the end of Spector by upholding a tax
equivalent to that in Spector and Complete Auto on the technicality that it was imposed on "doing business [within the state]
'in a corporate form."' 70 A year later the Stevedoring opinion
again invoked the 'Just share" concern in sustaining a Spectorlike tax:
Complete Auto recognized that a State has a significant interest in exacting from interstate commerce its fair share of the cost of state government.... The Commerce Clause balance tips against the tax only
when it unfairly burdens commerce
by exacting more than a just share
71
from the interstate activity.

Thus, Complete Auto and Stevedoring both emphatically stress
that the policy of making interstate commerce pay its fair share
of the cost of local government is now fully applicable to state
taxes on the privilege or business of engaging in interstate
commerce.
In Complete Auto, the Court also endorsed the need to
judge the validity of taxes on the processes of interstate commerce by their "practical effect" on commerce. Referring approvingly to a series of cases that had "considered not the
formal language of the tax statute but rather its practical effect,"72 the Court noted that it had "applied this practical analysis in approving many types of taxes that avoided running
afoul" of the Spector rule.7 3 The Court indicated that it intended to apply the same analysis to cases like Stevedoring
and Complete Auto by stressing in the opinions that the taxpayers had made no claim7 4 or had not developed a factual record 75 under the practical criteria used for deciding the validity
of taxes affecting interstate commerce.
The Court's disapproving comments about the Spector rule
made the same point. In Complete Auto it commented that the
rule "deems irrelevant any consideration of the practical effect
of the tax,, 76 and "has no relationship to economic realities.
Rather it stands only as a trap for the unwary draftsman."7 7 In
70. Id. at 104.
71. 435 U.S. at 748 (citations omitted).
72. 430 U.S. at 279; see id. at n.8.
73. Id. at 279.
74. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 277-78, 287.
75. See Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos.,
435 U.S. at 750-51.
76. 430 U.S. at 278.
77. Id. at 279. The opinion documented this statement by contrasting the
differing results in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia (Railway Express
I), 347 U.S. 359, 364, 369 (1954) (invalid when tax measured by gross receipts
was on "privilege of doing business") and Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Vir-
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the Court's view, the Spector rule results in "a focus on ... formalism [that] merely obscures the question whether the tax
78
produces a forbidden effect."
These considerations, developed at some length in Complete Auto, were succinctly summarized in Stevedoring:
With the distinction between direct and indirect taxation of interstate commerce thus discarded, the constitutionality under the Commerce Clause of the application of the Washington business and
occupation tax to stevedoring depends upon the practical effect of the
exaction. As was recognized in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,. . interstate commerce must bear its fair share of the state tax
burden. The Court repeatedly has sustained taxes that are applied to
activity with a substantial nexus with the State, that are fairly apportioned, that do not discriminate against interstate commerce, and that
79
are fairly related to the services provided by the State.

That last sentence succinctly restated the four criteria for
validity that the Court in Complete Auto had twice summarized
in substantially identical terms, once when describing what it
called the "practical analysis" applied when the Court based
the validity of taxes on their "practical effect," 80 and once when
the opinion upheld the tax by noting that "no claim is made"
under any of the four criteria.81 Both the Complete Auto and
Stevedoring opinions thus equated these four criteria with
judging the validity of a tax by its "practical effect" on interstate commerce. Although these criteria were developed in
cases deciding the validity of taxes not subject to the Formal
Rule, both opinions made explicit the Court's decision to apply
them now to taxes previously struck down because imposed on
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. 82 Indeed, in
Stevedoring the Court devoted a paragraph to demonstrating
briefly that the tax in question satisfied each of the criteria.83
ginia (Railway Express II), 358 U.S. 434, 438, 440, 445 (1959) (valid when tax
measured by gross receipts was labeled "franchise tax" on "intangible property" in form of "going concern value"); and the different results in taxes measured by fairly apportioned net income in Spector, 340 U.S. at 609-10 (invalid
when on privilege of engaging in interstate commerce) and Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 464-65 (1959) (valid
when imposed on net income, though taxpayer engaged exclusively in interstate commerce). See 430 U.S. at 284-85.
78. 430 U.S. at 288.
79. 435 U.S. at 750 (citation omitted).
80. 430 U.S. at 279.
81. Id. at 287.
82. Id.
83. 435 U.S. at 750-51. Two years later the Court, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980), upholding an apportioned net income
tax, quoted and described the Complete Auto formulation of the four criteria as
"an endeavor to establish a consistent and rational method of inquiry" by examining "the practical effect of a challenged tax." Id. at 443.
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Each of the stated criteria is no more than a short-hand label for a complex set of considerations. Discrimination 84 and
fair apportionment, 85 coupled with its corollary, the avoidance
of multiple tax burdens on interstate commerce not borne by
local commerce, 86 are familiar criteria, some of whose applications in recent years have produced critical appraisals and
close divisions within the Court.87 While "substantial nexus" is
a familiar concept related to due process jurisdiction, 88 which is
often not associated with practical effect concerns, a prime and
"practical effect" consequence of the nexus requirement is to
protect interstate commerce from cumulative taxation. 89 Less
familiar and of less consequence is the criterion that a tax must
be "fairly related to the services provided by the State." 90 This
criterion does not mean what it seems to say, and appears satisfied if the tax is fairly related to activities, income, or property
attributable to the taxing state. 9 '
The Court's repeated listing of these four criteria raises a
question: is the Court implying that its examination of the
practical effect of a tax will be limited to these four criteria?
Most practical effect claims will fall under one or more of them,
but I cannot believe that the Court meant to exclude others.
Such a restriction would be inconsistent with the thrust of
Complete Auto's repudiation of a requirement 92 that prevented
84. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
85. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317
(1968).
86. See, e.g., J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
87. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); General Motors
Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court4 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and
Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L REV. 149, 164-76 (1976).
88. See, e.g., Brainiff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization &
Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
89. See L. TRIBE, AMERmc CONSTrTUTIONAL LAw 367 (1978).
90. Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435
U.S. at 750; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 279; see, e.g., Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
91. For example, in Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue,
419 U.S. 560 (1975), the Court found the "fair relation" criterion satisfied by a
tax on doing business measured by gross receipts from all sales made in the
state by an out-of-state manufacturer, who negotiated all sales from out of state
and maintained within the state one engineer, helped every six weeks by three
others, who kept the manufacturer informed of the buyer's needs and the
names of its buying agents, and who arranged for testing of sample products
and helped resolve problems of use after receipt of the products. Id. at 561, 564.
It sufficed to satisfy the criterion that the engineer's "full time job within the
state made possible the realization and continuance of valuable contractual relations between appellant and Boeing." Id. at 562.
92. This requirement was, of course, the Formal Rule.
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consideration of the practical effect of a tax. In my view the
Court should and will give consideration to any demonstrable,
realistic claim that a state tax has a seriously harmful effect on
interstate commerce, even though the tax satisfies the four
stated criteria.
B.

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE COMPLETE A UTO RATIONALE TO

OTHER TYPES OF TAxES

Do Complete Auto and Stevedoring sap the authority of the
long line of decisions 93 that have invoked one form or another
of the Formal Rule to strike down various types of state taxes
other than the Spector "doing business" type? I think they do.
In my judgment these recent decisions signal the end of the
Formal Rule in all of its tax manifestations. The reasons given
for overruling Spector apply with equal force to the other applications of the Formal Rule, which were all derived from the
common rationale that Complete Auto unanimously rejected.
That rationale, I remind you, was simply that a state tax imposed on an activity or process viewed as interstate commerce
itself was an invalid "regulation of commerce" within the exclusive power of Congress, without regard for and with no need to
consider the practical impact of the particular tax on commerce.9
The policy judgment in Complete Auto-that a state must
be allowed to require interstate commerce to pay its fair share
of the cost of state government-was not unique to a tax on the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. The Court had
earlier invoked the same policy in sustaining several different
types of taxes that were not subject to the Formal Rule.95 Now
that the Court in Complete Auto has applied this policy to sustain one of the principal taxes within the Formal Rule, it would
be difficult to justify disregarding the policy in deciding the validity of the other types of taxes that have been subject to the
Formal Rule in the past. And there is no reason to expect the
Court to do so.
93. See note 35 supra.

94. See text accompanying notes 14-30 supra.
95. See, e.g., Northwestern States Port. Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 461-62 (1959) (state income tax on company engaged exclusively in interstate commerce); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33,
49-50, 59 (1940) (sales tax by buyers' state on interstate sales viewed as tax on
transfer of possession after end of interstate commerce); Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 258-61 (1938) (tax on publication of magazines
measured by advertising gross receipts).
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Similarly, the Court's emphasis in Complete Auto on the
importance of a tax's "economic realities" rather than its "formal phrasing"9 6 seems equally relevant to the validity of any
type of tax that previously has been held invalid because imposed on some activity or process of interstate commerce without regard for the practical effect of the tax. The Court's policy
conclusion that the validity of taxes on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce should depend upon a "practical
analysis" of their effect on interstate commerce9 7 is equally
persuasive when the issue is the validity of other types of taxes
previously struck down under the Formal Rule. Such an analysis requires the application of criteria developed in cases involving taxes not subject to the Formal Rule. The problems of
applying such a "practical analysis" to taxes on sales, or transportation, or some other aspect of interstate commerce should,
however, be no greater than those associated with Spector-type
taxes.
In Complete Auto the Court decided that, in protecting interstate commerce from harmful state taxes, it should no
longer avoid the difficult problems concerning the effect of challenged taxes by resorting to a blanket rule against taxes on the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. The opinion's
footnote fifteen rejects the argument that such a tax could be
"easily tailored to single out interstate businesses and subject
them to effects forbidden by the Commerce Clause."9 8 The
Court responded that other kinds of taxes, such as property
and income taxes (not subject to the Spector rule), could also
be "tailored" to harm interstate commerce, so that a "tailored
tax, however accomplished, must receive the careful scrutiny of
the courts to determine whether it produces a forbidden effect
on interstate commerce." 99 The Court could "perceive no reason" for viewing such a tax on the "privilege of doing business"
as "creating a qualitatively different danger so as to require a
per se rule of unconstitutionality."oo
The Court thus unanimously rejected a per se rule designed to protect interstate commerce by means of a judicially
created "free trade" zone that would obviate the need for careful judicial scrutiny concerning the effects of a tax. That this
96. 430 U.S. at 279-81; see text accompanying notes 72-78 supra, 107, 109 infra.
97. 430 U.S. at 279.
98. Id. at 288 n.15.
99. Id.

100. Id.
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was the nature of the policy judgement is further indicated by
the Court's answer in footnote fifteen to the argument that "a
rule of absolute immunity for interstate commerce" would relieve the Court of such "difficult judgments"':101 "administrative
convenience, in this instance, is insufficient justification for
abandoning the principle that 'interstate commerce may be
made to pay its way.' "102 That policy judgment-to forego the
easy resort to a per se rule and make the more difficult judgments concerning the effect of taxes on commerce so that
states could require interstate commerce to pay its way---cannot logically be limited to a Spector-type tax. It appears
equally applicable to all state taxes.
C.

OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF COMPLETE AUTO AND STEVEDORING

Apart from the universal applicability of the reasons advanced for overruling Spector, at two points the Complete Auto
and Stevedoring opinions went beyond a Spector-type tax to
repudiate the Formal Rule more broadly.
The Court's comments in Complete Auto concerning *Freeman v. Hewit,10 3 which it called "the modern origin of the
Spector rule,"' 04 reflect its disapproval of the Formal Rule as
applied to an entirely different type of tax-a gross receipts tax
by the seller's state on the proceeds of an interstate sale.
Before Freeman the same tax had been struck down on the
"practical effects" ground that if the seller's state could tax the
gross receipts, so could the buyer's, which would subject interstate commerce to "the risk of a double tax burden" not borne
by local commerce.1 05 The majority in Freeman disregarded
this rationale in holding the tax invalid. Instead, the Freeman
majority, according to Justice Blackmun in Complete Auto, "announced a blanket prohibition against any state taxation imposed directly on an interstate transaction," ruling that "a
direct tax on interstate sales, even if fairly apportioned and
nondiscriminatory, was... unconstitutional per se."106
Although Freeman was not an issue in Complete Auto, and
hence not expressly overruled, the Court's comments on Freeman in Complete Auto indicate unanimous disapproval of Freeman's application and endorsement of the Formal Rule as
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 329 U.S. 249 (1946); see text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
104. 430 U.S. at 279.
105. J.D. Adams Mig. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938).
106. 430 U.S. at 280; see Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. at 253-57.
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applied to a tax on gross receipts from interstate sales. Justice
Blackmun noted that Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion in
its ecoFreeman had "argued that the tax should be judged by
07
Justice
nomic effects rather than by its formal phrasing."
Blackmun summarized the considerations that Rutledge would
weigh in determining the validity of the tax, which were closely
akin to the four criteria repeatedly stated in Complete Auto.108
Finally, he invoked the criticism of Freeman by academic
scholars who viewed the opinion "as a triumph of formalism
over substance."' 09
Though the Court only restated in Complete Auto, and did
not expressly endorse, the criticisms aimed at Freeman, the
close parallel of those criticisms to the reasons given in Complete Auto for overruling Spector make clear the Court's approval of those criticisms and its rejection of Justice
Frankfurter's Freeman rationale. Indeed, its incorporation of
those criticisms into the Complete Auto opinion can fairly be
viewed as an integral part of the Court's marshalling of reasons
for overruling Spector. Further, by characterizing Freeman as
the "modem origin of the Spector rule" in a case overruling
Spector, the Court signaled its disapproval of the majority view
in Freeman. Thus, we can reasonably conclude that since 1977
the Formal Rule has not been a viable basis for invalidating a
tax on interstate sales, or on gross receipts therefrom.
This conclusion appears confirmed in one sentence of
Stevedoring. After invoking Complete Auto as authority,"n0 the
majority stated: "With the distinction between direct and indirect taxation of interstate commerce thus discarded, the consti107. 430 U.S. at 280.
108. "In [Justice Rutledge's] view, a state tax is unconstitutional only if the
activity lacks the necessary connection with the taxing state to give jurisdic-

tion to tax,'.

. .

or if the tax discriminates against interstate commerce, or if

the activity is subject to multiple taxation." Id. at 280-81 (citation omitted).
Compare these criteria with those repeatedly stressed in Complete Auto: (1)

discrimination appears as a criterion in both; (2) "multiple taxation" is related

to fair apportionment; (3) "necessary connection with the taxing state," is synonymous with "substantial nexus". 430 U.S. at 287. Only the Complete Auto
criterion that a tax be "fairly related to the services provided by the state" was
omitted, but this concept is related to the nexus requirement. See Wisconsin v.
J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). It did not emerge as a separate crite-

rion until after Freeman. See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of

Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 562 (1975); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S.

436, 440-41 (1964).

109. 430 U.S. at 281 (citing P. HARTmAN, STATE TAXATION OF LNTERSTATE
COMMERCE 200-04 (1953); Dunham, Gross Recepits Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 CoLm. L. REV. 211 (1947)).
110. 435 U.S. at 749-50.
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tutionality [of the tax as applied] depends upon the practical
effect of the exaction.""' Should this sweeping statement be
viewed as limited to the particular type of tax before the Court?
I think not. Complete Auto's criticism of making the validity of
a tax depend upon whether it is imposed "directly on" some act
of interstate commerce1 2 was expressly aimed at an opinion
(Freeman) that had applied that reasoning of the Formal Rule
to a very different type of tax--one on gross receipts from interstate sales. The Court's broad statement in Stevedoring that
Complete Auto had "discarded" the distinction between direct
and indirect taxation in favor of applying criteria relevant to
the tax's "practical effect" gave no weight to the particular type
of tax before the Court.

D. THE BROAD SCOPE OF COMPLETE AUTO
In considering the impact of Complete Auto on other types
of taxes previously subject to the Formal Rule, the broad scope
of the Complete Auto ruling itself should not be overlooked.
Complete Auto must be viewed as overruling the full line of
cases represented by Spector, whether the tax was imposed on
the privilege of engaging in business or simply on the business
or occupation itself. Spector and most of its predecessors happened to involve privilege taxes, because this has been a common method of labeling taxes on doing business, but the Court
has applied exactly the same rule to invalidate taxes that in
form were imposed simply on doing business or engaging in
business without any reference to taxing a "privilege."" 3 The
Court cited such "doing-business" tax cases as involving the
same issue as those invalidating privilege taxes," 4 and on occasion expressly equated occupation or doing-business taxes ap111. Id. at 750.
112. 430 U.S. at 279-81.
113. See Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 207
(1925) (tax for "carrying on or doing of business ... within the Commonwealth"); Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 154 (1918) ("essentially a tax on doing an interstate business and therefore repugnant to the
commerce clause").
114. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 486 (1959) (Whittaker, J., dissenting) (citing Cheney and Alpha Cement
with Spector and Ozark Pipe Line); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340
U.S. 602, 609 (1951) (citing Alpha Cement with several privilege tax cases); Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 298 U.S. 553, 555 (1936)
(citing Cheney and Alpha Cement with Ozark Pipe Line (privilege tax) to support proposition that state tax on doing business is invalid if business is exclusively interstate); Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1925)
(citing Cheney to support ruling invalidating tax on privilege).
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plied to interstate business with privilege taxes on engaging in
such business." 5
There was good reason for this identity of treatment. The
rationale underlying Spector-thatsuch a tax was a "regulation
of commerce" within the exclusive power of Congress-applied
equally to every such business tax, whether or not called a
"privilege tax." The taxes were invalid regardless of the label
attached; they all threatened the "free trade" area of commerce
the Court had been protecting against "direct" taxes by means
of the Formal Rule. But when the Court in Complete Auto
found that threat no longer sufficient to justify striking down
such taxes, it advanced reasons for overruling Spector that apply with equal weight to all taxes on doing interstate business,
whether designated an occupation, business, or "privilege" tax.
Surely the Court that decided in Complete Auto to base the validity of the tax on its practical effect and economic realities
would not interpret that ruling as based on some unstated significance derived from the word "privilege," when the economic
realities and practical effect are the same with or without that
6
word."
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE PREDICTED END OF THE
FORMAL RULE
A.

THE GENERAL IMPACT

From the foregoing we can reasonably conclude that the
Court is not likely to invoke again the Formal Rule to invalidate
state taxes. This policy will have three general consequences.
First, it will give the states greater latitude to formulate taxes
without regard for the formalities that have been drafting
hazards in the past. At the same time it should encourage the
115. See Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 681-82 (1949)
(Reed, J., dissenting) ("So long as a tax on the privilege of doing interstate

business or a tax on the doing of that business is prohibited, interstate commerce remains free from state exactions levied on that commerce."); Ozark
Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 562 (1925) (invalidating "franchise" tax,
said by Court to be "upon the privilege or right to do business;" Court invoked

as "settled" the rule that "a State cannot lay a tax on interstate commerce in
any form, whether on the transportation of subjects of commerce, the receipts
derived therefrom, or the occupation or business of carrying it on.").

116. For example, see Justice Blackmun's remark in Complete Auto: 'There

is no economic consequence that follows necessarily from the use of the particular words, 'privilege of doing business,' and a focus on that formalism merely

obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect." 430 U.S. at
288.
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drafters to weigh carefully foreseeable practical effect considerations.
In addition, this policy will eliminate the expensive and
tantalizing game of counseling, and when needed, litigating
whether a particular tax is imposed on a process, activity, or
business that the Court is likely to view as an integral part of
interstate commerce itself, and hence subject to the Formal
Rule, or whether the tax is sufficiently removed from interstate
commerce to be treated as a taxable local incident. Repeatedly
this issue has been controlling,"17 however sterile it might be in
terms of protecting interstate commerce from harmful taxation.
Presumably, it will no longer be an issue.
Finally, this policy will change the focus of much of the litigation over state taxation of interstate commerce from formal
to practical considerations concerning the effect of the tax.
Certainly, the elimination of the Formal Rule will not mean
that all taxes previously voided under the Formal Rule will now
be valid. In both Complete Auto and Stevedoring the Court
emphasized that the validity of taxes on interstate commerce
should now be judged by their practical effect in light of the criteria developed in passing on taxes outside the Formal Rule.
Some such decisions will be relatively easy, as was true in
Complete Auto and Stevedoring where the taxes, which were
upheld, were measured by gross receipts from interstate transportation confined to segments within the taxing state, and
hence not subject to taxation by other states. In those cases
there was no basis for harmful "practical effects" claims under
the four criteria or otherwise. But on occasion the "practical effects" issues will require quite difficult judgments, as the Court
acknowledged in Complete Auto,118 and as demonstrated the
next year when a divided Court encountered a difficult corporate income tax issue involving fair apportionment and a claim
of potential multiple burden." 9
117. Compare McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33
(1940) (valid-tax viewed as imposed on transfer after end of interstate transportation) with McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944) (invalid-tax
viewed as "on an interstate transaction"); compare Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v.
Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925) (invalid-tax viewed as on business of operating interstate pipeline) with Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948)
(valid-tax viewed as imposed on local maintenance and repair activities of
pipeline company transporting natural gas exclusively interstate). For more

detail, see P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 99-107
(1953).
118. 430 U.S. at 288 n.15.
119. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); see text accompanying
notes 194-95 infra.
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In the remaining sections of this Article, I will explore
some of the issues likely to arise under the "practical effects"
approach when taxes like those previously voided under the
Formal Rule are challenged.

B. TAXEs FoRMERLY VOIDED UNDER THE FoRMAL RULE:
"PRACTICAL EFFEcTs" IssuEs
1. Property Taxes on Goods in Transit
We have already noted that the Formal Rule originated
with State Freight Tax, 12 0 which held invalid as applied to interstate cargo a tax on transportation companies measured by
tons of cargo carried within the state. This ban on taxing cargo
in interstate commerce was soon extended to ad valorem property taxes. 2 1 Goods considered in transit in interstate commerce were immune from state property taxation under the
Formal Rule. The only real issue in such cases was whether
the interstate transit had started or ended before the state's
property tax date.122
If we assume the Formal Rule is now dead, would application of property taxes to goods in interstate transit raise "practical effect" issues that might still invalidate the tax? Though
basing its decision on Formal Rule reasoning, the Court in
State Freight Tax mentioned the danger that if one state may
tax interstate transportation, "every other may," which would
cause "commercial intercourse between States" to be "crushed
under the load of many" such taxes.123 This reasoning suggests
the later multiple burden rationale with its "fair apportionment" requisite. Would property taxes on goods in transit
threaten a multiple burden on interstate commerce not borne
by local commerce because similar taxes might be imposed by
other states through which the cargo passes?
Would not the validity of such a tax depend upon its
terms? After the first decision invalidating such a tax, 24 no at120. See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
121. See Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1926);
Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366, 376-77 (1922); Kelley v.
Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1903); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1886).
122. See Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 9 (1933); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517,
525 (1886). See also Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469, 473
(1926); Ferrell & Smith, State Jurisdictionto Tax Tangible PersonalProperty,
56 N.C.L. REV. 807, 817-24 (1978).
123. 82 U.S. (15 WalL) at 280; see text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
124. See Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1903) (tax apparently attempted
here only because the sheep were being slowly moved across the state on foot,

grazing en route.)
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tempt appears to have been made to impose a property tax on

goods actually in interstate transit.125 But could a state, if it

wished, impose fairly apportioned personal property taxes on
interstate cargo in order to require commerce to help pay for
the governmental services that protect cargo in transit along
with other personal property in the state?
It would seem feasible to draft a valid statute to tax cargo
in transit by use of an apportionment formula designed to ascertain the average daily value of cargo within the state in the
possession of each carrier throughout the year, and to tax that
value once yearly on the same basis as inventory and other
personal property.126 If we assume a "fair apportionment,"
such a tax would create no risk of a greater tax burden on interstate than on local commerce. If all other states traversed
by the carrier were to impose a similar tax, an invalid multiple
burden would not be threatened because each state would be
able to tax only the average daily value of goods within that
state throughout the year.127 The total cargo thus taxed in all
states would not exceed the total average daily value of the carrier's cargo.128
The Court has long upheld analogous methods of determining for tax purposes the value of railroad rolling stock within
the state at all times. 129 I see no sound reason, with the Formal

Rule discarded, to apply a different policy to taxation of cargo
in transit.13 0 True, in the rolling stock cases the railroads were
125.

The other cases cited in note 121 supra involved the issue of whether

goods taxed when not in actual transit were to be viewed as legally in transit.
126. I have seen no such tax proposed, and question its economic desirability in view of the availability of gross receipts and net income taxes, both of
which are likely to be more productive. I have made no effort to draft the type
of formula suggested. Presumably, it could ascertain the average daily value of
cargo for the year and allocate a fraction of this to the taxing state by using
factors relevant to the normal distribution of cargo throughout the carrier's
routes.
127. The formula need produce only a fair approximation of the average
daily value of cargo in the state. Cf. Moorman Mig. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267,27374 (1978) (both Iowa and Illinois formulas are only "a rough approximation" of
income attributable to the state, but "[sitates have wide latitude in the selection of apportionment formulas" for income tax, so long as income attributed to
the state is not "out of all appropriate proportions" to business done there).
128. Cf. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891) (if a
mileage allocation "were adopted by all the States through which these cars
ran, the company would be assessed upon the whole value of its capital stock,
and no more").
129. See, e.g., Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 172-74
(1949); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891).
130. Professor Hartman made a similar suggestion years ago. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 117, at 74.
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taxed on their own property, whereas in the cases of carriers
for hire an average daily value cargo would have to be imposed
on the carriers, not the cargo owners. But the carriers would
pass it on, like other costs, in the freight rates ultimately paid
by the owners of all cargo shipped.131 The effect would be to
require those using transportation facilities within the state to
pay their fair share of the cost of state government that protects their property when it is within the state, based on the
property's approximate value. Such a tax is analogous to the
property taxes paid by manufacturers, merchants, and others
who keep an inventory within the state.
So far as the other criteria are concerned, such a property
tax on the average daily value of cargo should satisfy the due
process nexus criterion. The tax would be based on the approximate value of the cargo continuously within the state
throughout the year, though in transit, just as in the case of
railroad rolling stock. For similar reasons, such a tax should
also satisfy the "fair relation" criterion; the tax would be based
upon the value of property within the state and protected by its
governmental services.
2. Retail Sales Taxes
When many states turned to consumers' retail sales taxes
for revenue in the depression of the 1930s, it was generally assumed that the Formal Rule barred both the buyer's and the
seller's states from taxing an interstate sale,132 one in which
the seller contracts to sell to the buyer in another state goods
to be delivered from the seller's to the buyer's state. Through
adroit analysis, the Court in 1940 avoided the Formal Rule in
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. 133 to sustain a
retail tax by the buyer's state, but four years later in McLeod v.
.E. Dilworth Co.,134 it applied the Formal Rule to invalidate
such a tax. McLeod has never been overruled. There has been
little need to question it since the compensatory use tax rulings
permit the buyer's state to impose the equivalent of the sales
131. There should be no constitutional problem in making the carrier-possessor pay the tax, particularly when the carrier would redistribute it to the
shippers through freight rates. See, e.g., National Geographic v. California
Equalization Bd., 430 U.S. 551, 558 (1977); Felt &Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher,
306 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1939); Monomotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 93 (1934).
132. See P. HARTmAN, supra note 117, at 149-51; Lockhart, supra note 1, at
618-19.
133. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
134. 322 U.S. 327 (1944); see text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
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tax on the buyer for use of the product within the state135 and
to require out-of-state sellers subject to the buyer's state's ju36
risdiction to collect the tax for the state at the time of sale.1
Though the validity of the sales tax on an interstate sale is itself thus not of earthshaking importance, it is worth brief discussion, both to facilitate simple drafting to omit the use tax
circumlocution and to clarify tax doctrine because related questions may arise in connection with other types of sales taxes,
such as those on manufacturers or wholesalers.
If we assume again the end of the Formal Rule, does a retail sales tax by the buyer's state on an interstate sale satisfy
the four "practical effect" criteria for a valid tax? Such taxes
are not "apportioned" in the narrow sense, for they are measured by a percentage of the total sales price. But with such
taxes the Court has already informally alloted the full amount
of the sales price exclusively to the buyer's state, and thereby
eliminated the risk of multiple taxation at which the "fair apportionment" criterion is aimed. The Court in both BerwindWhite, sustaining the buyer's state sales tax by avoiding the
Formal Rule, and Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,137 sustaining
the compensatory use tax, emphasized that "equality is its
theme" since the buyer's state could collect from an interstate
sale only the same tax burden borne by local sales. 38
This would only be true, however, if the seller's state could
not apply its retail sales tax to such sales. Although the Court
did not explicitly say so in Berwind-White, the majority appears to have assumed the invalidity of such a tax by the
seller's state. 3 9 At any rate, the issue was decided in 1972 in
Evco v. Jones, 40 when the Court struck down a retail sales tax
imposed by a seller's state on an interstate sale by invoking the
risk of a multiple tax burden rationale.141 So long as the
135. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582-83 (1937).
136. See, e.g., National Geographic v. California Equalization BcL, 430 U.S.
551, 558 (1977); General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 338
(1944); Nelson v. Sears Roebuck &Co., 312 U.S. 359, 364 (1941). But see National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967) (no jurisdiction).
137. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
138. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 48-49 (1940);
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583-84 (1937).
139. See Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes--The Berwind-White
Case, 53 HAxv. L. REv. 909, 927 (1940).
140. 409 U.S. 91 (1972) (terms of tax same as typical sales and use tax
though called "gross receipts tax").
141. Id. at 93-94 (quoting J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311

(1938)).
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seller's state is not permitted to impose a retail sales tax on an
interstate sale,142 there would appear to be no danger of discrimination, unfair apportionment, or a multiple tax burden
when the buyer's state is permitted to collect a consumer tax
measured by the full sales price, whether called a sales tax or a
use tax.
A sales tax by the buyer's state on an interstate sale should
also readily satisfy the substantial nexus criterion. Approximately half of the acts involved in such a sales transaction occur within the buyer's state. There the buyer acts to form the
contract of sale, as the buyer accepts the offer to sell or makes
a counter-offer; there the buyer makes payment for the goods,
whether by mail or otherwise; there the buyer receives final delivery of the goods into his or her possession; and there the
buyer finally uses or disposes of them. These acts provide ample basis for the buyer's state to impose a sales tax on the
buyer.
The only real nexus problem is in finding jurisdiction to impose upon an out-of-state seller the obligation to collect the
sales tax from the buyer at the time of sale, which is the effective way to collect the tax. That is actually what Arkansas
sought in McLeod.143 The Court gave as one reason for invalidating the tax that the sale occurred outside of Arkansas when
the seller gave the goods to the carrier in Tennessee for delivery to the buyers in Arkansas: "[A]ccording to practical notions of what constitutes a sale . . .the sale-the transfer of
ownership-was made in Tennessee. For Arkansas to impose a
tax on such transactions would be to project its powers beyond

its boundaries ....1144
In making this nexus ruling, the Court appeared to give no
consideration to the factors noted above connecting the buyer's
state with the sale, nor to the seller's presence there through
salesmen taking orders in Arkansas. Yet on the same day as
McLeod, and under similar facts, the Court in General Trading
5
Co. v. State Tax Commission14
recognized that Iowa had juris142. Evco, which so ruled, seems solidly based since it rested not on the
Formal Rule but on the danger of a multiple tax burden if the seller's state
could impose a retail sales tax on interstate sales. While not saying so, the
Court must have had in mind that it had already given its blessing to the
buyer's state's collection of an equivalent tax from interstate sales, both
through use taxes and through retail sales taxes when they could escape the
Formal Rule.
143. 322 U.S. 327 (1940).
144. Id. at 329-30.

145. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).

1050

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1025

diction to require an out-of-state seller, whose salesmen took
orders in Iowa, to collect and remit Iowa's use tax on interstate
sales. This case differed from McLeod only in calling the tax
one on "use" rather than on "sale." To thus make controlling
the title transfer in Tennessee because of sales law doctrine
unrelated to taxation while disregarding the transaction's substantial connections with the taxing state, and to invalidate a
tax because it was called a sales tax instead of a use tax, is to
engage in the same kind of formal reasoning unrelated to economic realities that the Court rejected in Complete Auto.146
Now that the Court has rejected such formal reasoning concerning the commerce clause, will it not likewise reject such
due process jurisdiction formal reasoning when, in fact, the
taxed transaction has substantial connections with the taxing
state and the practical effect of the tax is the same whether
called a "use" or a "sales" tax?
There are thus good reasons to expect the Court to sustain
retail sales taxes by the buyer's state on interstate sales whenever the transactions have substantial connections with that
state, and to permit the buyer's state to require the seller from
another state to collect a consumer tax, whatever called, whenever the seller has a substantial nexus with the buyer's state.
Can the seller avoid that collection burden by staying out
of the buyer's state for all purposes? In 1967, the Court in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue 147 ruled that
the seller could do so, holding that an out-of-state seller with no
offices or agents in the buyer's state could not be required to
collect the use tax on extensive sales made to buyers there
only through catalogues and mail orders. 4 8 That case may,
however, be vulnerable now.
National Bellas Hess rested on two grounds no longer
available and on two that may yield to effective advocacy. The
first two were the Formal Rule14 9 and the "fair relation" test,
stated somewhat differently,'5 0 which the Court in National Ge146. Indeed, to justify invalidating the sales tax in McLeod, despite the admitted validity of a use tax with identical economic effects, the Court invoked
Formal Rule "area of free trade" reasoning. See 322 U.S. at 330-31; text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
147. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
148. Id. at 758.
149. The Court noted that it is "difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more exclusively interstate in character." Id. at 759.
150. The Court wrote of "local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose 'a fair share of the cost of the local government."' Id. at 760.
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ographicv. CaliforniaEqualizationBoard151 ruled in 1977 does
not apply to a simple duty on a seller to collect and remit an52
other's tax.1
The third ground was the lack of a due process nexus because the seller was absent from the state. The Court declined
six to three "to repudiate totally the sharp distinction [previously] drawn between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State, and those who do no more
than communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business."153 On
that issue enterprising lawyers, taking their cue from the National Bellas Hess dissent, 54 might possibly persuade a majority of today's more practical-minded Court to find sufficient
nexus to require mere collection of the tax in the seller's largescale, continuous, and systematic exploitation of the consumers' market in a buyer's state, coupled with the seller's dependence on the state's legal system and its credit resources to
service its large volume of credit sales.
The fourth ground in NationalBellas Hess was the burden
imposed on interstate commerce by the various recordkeeping
requirements of many state and local taxing jurisdictions,
which "could entangle National's interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations."'SS Well-conceived evidence demonstrating the current availability of computer
technology that could now satisfy the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the different taxing jurisdictions without excessive costs might persuade the Court to reconsider and
abandon this 1967 conclusion that a use tax collection duty on
mail-order sellers would place too great a burden on commerce.
The sales or use tax itself must, of course, still satisfy the
"fair relation" criterion, but since these are consumer taxes ultimately paid by buyers based in the taxing state where the
goods are normally consumed or used, there is not only a "fair"
but a close relation between the tax based on the value of the
151. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
152. Id. at 560-62. Since the burden on the seller is only the "administrative
one of collecting" the tax, id. at 558, the duty to collect and pay it need not relate to the seller's activities within the state, so long as there is "some definite
link" between the seller and the state, found here in two offices soliciting national magazine advertising, wholly unrelated to the interstate mail order business in maps and books. Id. at 561.
153. 386 U.S. at 758.
154. Id. at 761-63 (Fortas, J., dissenting, joined by Black and Douglas, J.J.).
155. Id. at 759.
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56
goods and their use and presence within the taxing state.
I have limited this discussion on sales taxes to those on retail sales. Consideration of "practical effect" criteria requires
such particularity. Other types of sales taxes, such as those on
manufacturers or wholesalers, call for a different practical analysis directed to the terms and economic realities of the particular taxing statutes, but I leave that task for you.

3.

Gross Receipts Taxes

During the formative period for the Formal Rule the Court
held a tax on gross receipts from interstate transportation invalid as a tax on interstate transportation itself.157 With minor
deviations' 58 thereafter the Court repeatedly invalidated gross
receipts taxes on interstate commerce. 59 Even after Justice
Stone in Western Live Stock sought to limit the rule to unap60
portioned gross receipts taxes threatening a multiple burden,
the Court in Freeman reasserted the gross receipts tax rule in
1946 without regard to any risk of a multiple tax burden.161 But
with disapproval in Complete Auto of Freeman and the Formal
Rule reasoning, the rule against state taxes on or measured by
gross receipts from interstate commerce passed into history. It
now seems reasonable to conclude that no tax will be struck
down simply because it taxes gross receipts from interstate
commerce.
Of course, such a gross receipts tax is required to satisfy
the "practical effect" criteria. In particular, such taxes raise
"fair apportionment" problems to which the Court gave less
than adequate consideration in General Motors Corp. v. Washington162 in 1964 and Standard PressedSteel Co. v. Department
of Revenue' 63 in 1975. Both cases upheld Washington state's
"doing business" tax as applied to sellers, even though it was
measured by total gross receipts from interstate sales to Washington commercial buyers by out-of-state manufacturers who
156. In addition, there are the many connections between the transaction
and the buyers' state noted in this Article's nexus discussion. See text accompanying notes 142-43 supra.
157. Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
158. See, e.g., United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335, 346-48
(1912) (upheld gross receipts tax in lieu of property tax on interstate railroad).
159. See, e.g., Galveston, L & S.L Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908).
160. See 303 U.S. at 255-57. See also Lockhart, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transportationand Communication, 57 HIARv. L. REV. 40, 71-78 (1943).
161. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
162. 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
163. 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
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had representatives within the state 64 but negotiated the sales
from outside. Absent any showing of an actual "risk of a multiple tax burden,"165 the Court in Standard Pressed Steel said
that gross receipts were "apportioned exactly to the activities
taxed" since Washington taxed only gross receipts from sales
made to Washington buyers.166 But if the out-of-state seller's
state were to impose on the seller a "doing business" tax measured by gross receipts apportioned to include only that portion
of the receipts from Washington sales fairly attributable to the
manufacturer-seller's activities in its own state, the Court could
hardly avoid sustaining such a tax, meeting as it would all the
practical effect criteria. Would not the Court then have to recognize that a portion of the gross receipts it has allowed Washington to tax in General Motors and Standard Steel are no
longer fairly attributable to Washington?
The Court could scarcely have overlooked such possibilities when deciding General Motors and StandardPressedSteel.
Could it really have intended to require an actual multiple burden before striking down a tax for unfair apportionment, so
long as due process nexus and fair relation were satisfied?
Such a policy would make the validity of applying a tax to a
particular interstate transaction in the buyer's state depend
upon whether the seller's state for the year in question imposed a comparable tax on the same transaction. This would
produce both ad hoc unfairness in the individual applications
of the tax, and substantial complications in tax administration.167 The Court's 1972 decision in Evco v. Jones,168 which invoked the risk of a multiple burden to strike down a sales tax
in the seller's state without noting whether the buyer's state
had a comparable tax, indicates that the Court did not intend
9
such a sweeping rule. 6
164. The due process nexus and "fair relation" criteria were satisfied in
Standard Pressed Steel by one full-time employee in Washington, see 419 U.S.
at 561, 563, and in General Motors by many, who advanced the interests of the

seller in a variety of ways but did not themselves negotiate the interstate sales,
see 377 U.S. at 443-48.
165. See also 419 U.S. at 563; General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S.
436, 449 (1964).

166. 419 U.S. at 564. This "analytical nonsense ... about a 'fairly apportioned' 'unapportioned' tax," Hellerstein, supra note 87, at 171, appears only in
StandardPressed Steel, which invoked the authority of GeneralMotors but apparently sought in this manner to explain both rulings on the laconicallytreated multiple burden-apportionment issue.

167. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 278-90 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
168. 409 U.S. 91 (1972).
169. This indication finds support in the reasoning of Mobil Oil Co. v. Corn-
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Possibly in General Motors and Standard Steel the Court
"analogized gross receipts taxes to retail sales and use taxes"
permitted in the buyer's state but not in the seller's,170 but it is
hard to imagine the Court not then being aware of the strong
claim that the manufacturer-seller's state would have to tax a
fairly attributable portion of the gross receipts from products
manufactured in the state and sold through interstate negotiations conducted from there by the seller. Or, while being aware
of the problem, the Court may have concluded, as it did in a
more recent net income tax case,17 1 that working out an analytically sound apportionment scheme for interstate manufacturing and merchandising is more appropriately a legislative
function that should be left to Congress, 172 so long as the
Washington tax constituted no present practical threat to commerce and the out-of-state seller failed to show that other
states sought to tax the same receipts.
Such issues, as yet unresolved, call for renewed and
thoughtful analysis, both at the judicial and legislative levels,
particularly now that Complete Auto has foreclosed resort to
Formal Rule reasons and requires that we now resolve all such
problems on the basis of economic realities.
4. Taxes on Drummers
As previously noted, an important case in development of
the Formal Rule, Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District,7 3 held invalid the application to an out-of-state drummer of a fixed-sum
license tax on those taking orders for the sale of goods without
a licensed place of business in the taxing district. Many times
missioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 442-44 (1980), a state income tax apportionment opinion, in which the Court keeps alive the possibility of holding a tax

invalid because of its potential for a multiple burden without requiring proof of
an actual burden. See Hellerstein, State Income Taxation ofMultijurisdictional
Corporations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon and H.R. 5076, 79 MIcH L. REv. 113,
131-35 (1980).
170. See Hellerstein, supra note 87, at 171-72.

171. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978).
172. After extensive study aided by a distinguished advisory group, a House
of Representatives Committee in 1965 proposed a method of allocating gross receipts taxes, net income taxes, and sales and use taxes applicable to all states.
See generally H.R. REP. No. 952 (VoL 4), 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), H.R. REP.
No. 565 (VoL 3), 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1480 (Vols. 1, 2), 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). Bills to enact the recommendations have-been pending
in Congress since 1966, and once passed the House. For a recent version, see
H.R. 5, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). For recent, more focused efforts at congressional limits on state taxing power over commerce, see Hellerstein, supra note
169, at 113-15, 154-71.
173. 120 U.S. 489 (1887). See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
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thereafter the Court invoked the Formal Rule to strike down
state or local taxes on taking orders for the sale of goods, as applied to those representing out-of-state sellers. 7 4 Now that the
Formal Rule is without force, may "practical effect" considerations alone justify the continuation of this long-standing ban on
interstate drummers' taxes?
When such taxes are in a fixed amount without regard to
the volume of business done, decisions of the 1940s suggest
their continued invalidity on two grounds: (1) discrimination
against interstate commerce, and (2) potential exclusionary effect of such taxes on the establishment of a market for out-ofstate products. But in light of recent developments the Court
may require in such cases that the record demonstrate that the
actual operation of the tax does, in fact, cause such harms to
commerce.
Both grounds for the continued invalidity of such a tax
were suggested in Robbins itself, though the opinion rested on
the Formal Rule concept. The Court noted that the tax on
seeking orders was a "restriction" on "the very foundations of
interstate trade"--the developments of a market for out-of-state
products through order taking. 7 5 The majority also found discrimination favoring local, established retail merchants in their
exemption from the license tax, 7 6 despite the dissenters' argument that such merchants already paid both a tax on their
than fifty years of voiding such taxes under the
a 1940 the Court reached the same result based
.on in Best & Co. v. Maxwell.I7 8 It viewed as disirth Carolina's annual $250 tax on those not "regerchants" within the state who temporarily
ples to secure orders, because the "only cord-sum license tax" on local merchants was a $1
teal Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268 U.S. 325, 335
. Morgan, 185 U.S. 27, 37 (1902). For other such cases, see
)te 1, at 618 n.10.
494.
)2(Waite, C.J., dissenting). The majority's only response was
ble" that "merchants and manufacturers of other States" are
es where they reside." Id. at 498. But taxes on manufacture-type distributors, wherever located, would equally be inof goods sold by the interstate seller and the local merchant.
uld have the costs and taxes-but also the advantages-that
ail establishment.

4(1940).

I.
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"doing business" tax. 7 9 The majority in Best & Co. made no
reference to the other taxes on local merchants to which the
North Carolina Supreme Court had referred in sustaining the
tax.180
Finally, in Nippert v. City of Richmond,l 81 the next case involving such a tax, and the last one to date, the Court struck
down a $50 municipal license tax on solicitors, as applied to
those selling out-of-state goods, again without resort to the Formal Rule, but with reasons similar to the practical ones advanced in Robbins. The Court reasoned that such flat rate
taxes unrelated to the volume of business had both discriminatory and "potential excluding effects" for an "out-of-state itinerant" salesman who was subject to "the cumulative effect,
practically speaking, of flat municipal taxes laid in succession
upon [him] as he passes from town to town."' 8 2 The Court
viewed the tax as "prohibitive in an absolute sense, for many
applications," and "discriminatory in favor of the local
merchant as against the out-of-state one." 8 3 It concluded that
the tax "inherently involve [d] too many probabilities, and we
think actualities, for exclusion of or discrimination against in84
terstate commerce, in favor of local competing business."
As in Best & Co., the Court in Nippert concluded that the
tax had a discriminatory effect without recognizing the possibility that the tax on solicitors might be offset by different types
of taxes on competing local distributors. But Justice Douglas,
dissenting with Justice Murphy, protested making such a decision "without knowing what taxes the retail merchants in Richmond must pay. If the facts were known, it might appear that
the tax ...

in fact resulted in parity of treatment between Nip-

5
pert and her local competitors." 8
The Nippert argument that the tax had a "potential excluding effect" on those seeking local markets for out-of-state products is significant as an illustration of a "practical effect" basis
for challenging a tax on commerce outside of the four criteria
enumerated in Complete Auto. With a supporting factual record this should be an appropriate basis for invalidating a tax
even when no claim of discrimination could be made because

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 456.
See 216 N.C. 114, 120, 3 S.E.2d 292, 297 (1939).
327 U.S. 416 (1946).
Id. at 429-30.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 436-37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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of the absence of competing products. But, as suggested below,
in the future such a claim may have to be established by a
more detailed, factual showing.
For three reasons I suggest that Nippert should not be considered as settling even for the short run the invalidity of all
taxes on one seeking orders for sales of products to be shipped
from another state. First, a tax proportionate to the volume of
business might well be upheld. In both Best & Co. and Nippert
the Court stressed that the substantial fixed rate taxes involved
bore "no relation to actual or probable sales but [had to] be
paid in advance no matter how small the sales turn[ed] out to
be."186 Under those circumstances when no such tax was
imposed on the seller's true competitors, the local retail
merchants, the discriminatory burden on interstate commerce
could be severe. But if the tax on the solicitor varied with the
volume or value of the business done within the taxing district,
it would pose far less of a threat to interstate commerce. Its validity would appear assured if a similar, equal tax were im7
posed on local competing merchants.18
Second, in future interstate drummers' tax cases the Court
may consider the possible equalizing effect of other types of
taxes on local competing merchants. Since Nippert, the Court
has twice deviated from the Best & Co.-Nippert silent disregard
of different types of taxes on competing local activities. In both
cases, the Court concluded that the tax on interstate activities
was not discriminatory after comparing it with a different tax
on competing local activities. In Dunbar-StanleyStudios, Inc. v.
Alabama, 8 8 the Court found a $5 per week tax on out-of-state
traveling photographers not discriminatory when compared to
89
a $25 annual tax on local photographers with fixed locations.1
In Alaska v. Arctic Maid,19o it held Alaska's freezer ship tax of
4% of the value of fish frozen there (to be canned in other
states) not discriminatory when compared with Alaska's tax of
6% of the value of fish canned in Alaskan canneries.191
I do not suggest that these cases foreshadow Nippert's
186. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. at 456. In Nippert the Court stated that
"[t]he tax ... bore no relation to the volume of business done or of returns
from it." 327 U.S. at 427.
187. Cf. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. 309 U.S. 33, 48-49
(1940) (sales tax upheld, avoiding Formal Rule); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,
300 U.S. 577, 583-84 (1937) (compensatory use tax upheld).
188. 393 U.S. 537 (1969).
189. Id. at 542.
190. 366 U.S. 199 (1961).
191. Id. at 205.
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overruling. Dunbar-Stanley and Arctic Maid involved different
but comparable taxes on different but comparable local and interstate activities. The similarities of the taxes and activities
made relatively simple a comparison for purposes of deciding
whether the tax burden on interstate business was discriminatory.
Such an analysis in the case of a drummers' tax would be
much more complex. The competing local merchants' methods
of doing business are entirely different from the interstate
drummers' methods, and they are normally subject to entirely
different types of taxes. The difficulties of determining whether
the tax burdens of incomparable taxes on incomparable methods of doing business discriminate against interstate commerce, particularly since part of the interstate sellers' burden
may result from out-of-state taxes on out-of-state property and
activities, may well have kept the Court from tackling such
problems in Best & Co. and Nippert and may do so again. But
the infeasibility of comparing incomparable tax burdens may
not mandate continued invalidation of all flat rate taxes on
drummers making interstate sales. The Court's recent inclination to require a showing of actual harm to commerce, noted
next, may cause it to refuse to find a drummers' tax on interstate sales discriminatory when competing local merchants pay
substantial other taxes, absent proof of an actual discriminatory burden.
Finally, the Court's emphasis in Nippert on the mere "potential" of a tax to discriminate or exclude, without factual
proof of either, may no longer be an acceptable basis for invalidating state taxes. There are indications that the Court may
now be moving from the "potential" burden rationale of Nippert and J.D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storch,192 toward
the view Justice Douglas urged in his Nippert dissent when he
invoked the Brandeis view that such cases should not be based
on "speculation," but that absent facial discrimination one who
claims discrimination against commerce "in its actual operation
should be required to come forward with proof to sustain the
charge."193 Recent cases noted in my concluding remarks reveal a Court increasingly unpersuaded by speculative or potential harm to commerce, deduced in theory but not proved in
192. 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938).
193. 327 U.S. at 437 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For Justice Black's similar
view of "potential" multiple burdens, see J.D. Adams Mg. Co. v. Storen, 304
U.S. 307, 327-28 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
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fact. It would not be surprising if the Court were to require in a
future case like Nippert factual proof of an actual discriminatory tax burden on interstate transactiors.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I invite you to think about the probable effect of these developments on the lawyers' role in state taxation of interstate commerce. Now that the practical economic
effect of a tax is the controlling consideration, lawyers' tasks in
this area should be more demanding and satisfying because
more relevant to the real issues, whether the lawyer serves as
counselor, advocate, or judge. The determination of the validity
of taxes on interstate business will require, much more often
thgn in the past, realistic, detailed analysis of the particular tax
and others like it affecting both interstate and local commerce,
and their practical effect on the taxpayer's business and its capacity to compete with local business. The lawyer will be responsible for painstaking data gathering and analysis, often
with the aid of accountants and economists, and the development of effective methods for presenting the data and relating
it to appropriate criteria.
I take time to state this conclusion because of the understandable inclination among lawyers, oriented by the past judicial decisions in this area, to think in legal-rule terms, to make
logical, legalistic arguments rather than to develop and present
particularized analyses of the relevant economic effects of the
tax.
Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,194 a 1978 decision,
dramatizes this change in the Court's view of the type of record
needed to invalidate a state tax because of its practical effects.
Moorman manufactured animal feed in Illinois and sold 20% of
it in Iowa, where it had elevators and salesmen. For income tax
purposes, Iowa apportioned Moorman's total net income by the
ratio its sales in Iowa bore to its total sales, while Illinois apportioned the same net income by the usual three-factor
formula that weighed equally the ratio Moorman's property,
payroll, and sales in Illinois bore to the total of each. Moorman
argued that its Illinois operations, where it manufactured all its
feeds, were responsible for part of the profits generated by the
Iowa sales, and therefore, (1) Iowa was taxing some income
not attributable to Iowa, thus violating due process, and
194. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
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(2) Iowa was taxing some income also taxed by Illinois, thus
creating a multiple tax burden in violation of the commerce
clause.195 Rejecting both arguments, the Court termed "speculative" the "assumption" that Iowa was taxing income not attributable to Iowa.196 It stressed that
[t]he record does not contain any separate accounting analysis showing what portion of appellant's profits was attributable to sales, to manufacturing, or to any other phase of the company's operations....
[A] separate accounting analysis might have revealed that
...
more income from exploitalosses in Illinois operations prevented ...
19 7
tion of a highly favorable Iowa market.

Although other considerations also influenced the Moorman decision, the Court's opinion underlines the importance of
preparing and providing detailed factual support for claims
made under today's "practical effects" criteria. It signals reluctance to invalidate a state tax based on rational probabilities
when the Court believes supporting factual data should be
available. Today a lawyer invoking broad "practical effects" criteria like fair apportionment or multiple burden cannot safely
rely on making his or her case by logical deductions from underlying operative facts, such as the reasonable deduction by
Moorman's counsel that some of its net profits from sales in
Iowa must have been attributable to the manufacturing and
management activities occurring in Illinois. Instead, the lesson
from Moorrnan and other recent cases1 98 is that counsel mak195. Id. at 271-72.
196. Id. at 272, 276.
197. Id. at 272.
198. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436,
442-43 (1980). In upholding Vermont's inclusion of income from dividends in
calculating an apportioned net income tax on a petroleum company only marketing its products there, the Court stressed the taxpayer's failure to offer evidence on and "sustain its burden of proving" whether or not the many out-ofstate and foreign corporations paying dividends to the taxpayer were engaged
in activity that contributed to the taxpayer's integrated petroleum business.
The Court doubted, but did not decide, the validity of including dividends from
corporations not so contributing as part of apportionable net income. See id. at
443-45. (For the latest word on this issue, see Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 223-24 (1980)). For an excellent discussion of the
principal issues raised in Mobil and Exxon relating to income taxation of unitary business, see Hellerstein, supra note 169.
In Mobil Oil the taxpayer had focused exclusively on legal arguments relating to constitutional power that, if successful, would have excluded all dividends from the tax; perhaps it sought to avoid inviting the Court by the factual
record to sustain the tax as applied to dividends from contributing corporations. But the result when the legal arguments were rejected was to sustain
the tax in its entirety because the factual evidence that might have invalidated
a part of it was not provided. 445 U.S. at 442, 449.
General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. at 448-49, and Standard
Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. at 563-64, though laconic
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ing a "practical effect" attack on a state tax should be prepared
to establish harm to commerce by detailed factual data.199

and ambiguous on the risk of multiple taxation issue (see Hellerstein, supra
note 87, at 168-76), also demonstrate an inclination not to invalidate state taxes
on the basis of a potential for harm to commerce, but to require some kind of
factual showing.
199. The Court's downplaying in Exxon, see 447 U.S. at 220-21, 223, of its
comments in Moorman concerning the absence of an accounting analysis of the
profit or loss from the Ilinois manufacturing, see 437 U.S. at 272, in no way undermines the Moorman Court's stress on the taxpayer's failure to establish its
claim that Iowa sought to tax income attributable to Ilinois. Exxon involved
an entirely different issue for which separate accounting had entirely different
relevance. See Hellerstein, supra note 169, at 146-47.

